1 choice and public choice critiques of the initiative process. We argue that, despite recent rigorous scholarly attention as to the effects of initiatives 5 , we find little reason yet to reject the social and public choice criticisms of policy making via direct democracy. We then offer a series of anecdotes about the rise of crypto-initiatives, which are initiatives that use direct democracy as an instrument to achieve non-policy related goals. Finally, we conclude that the problems inherent in the initiative process are being magnified by the increase in crypto-initiatives and the rise of the crypto-political machines, the new 527 PACs, that sponsor them. Increasingly, the public welfare may be only an incidental consideration in the sponsorship, passage and implementation of initiatives. 6 This in turns implies that we consider anew limiting or amending the initiative process.
Policies, Initiatives and the Legislature
We begin with a discussion of the likely types of policies that will be pursued through initiative. We will argue, in this section, that the initiatives that appear on the ballot are likely to be extreme, relative to the legislative median. In the sections that follow, we will argue that voters face significant informational and agenda manipulation problems, which can lead to the adoption of policies that are worse than the status quo for most of the public.
Although we will later discuss the rise of crypto-initiatives, for which policy is not the primary goal, let us begin by considering initiatives for which policy change is the primary goal.
We assume that there is someone who wants to change policy and as a starting point, we assume a simple spatial model of policy choice, as is common in the literature. 7 We assume that each 5 For a survey see Lupia and Matsuska (2004) supra note 3. 6 There are many forms of initiatives: constitutional, statutory, bonds and annexation to name a few. In this paper we are primarily concerned with state level initiatives that are either constitutional or statutory in nature. 7 We further assume that actions are costly. That is, it is costly to lobby the legislature to get them to take up issue κ ∈ [1, …Κ] and change policy on that issue to F k . 9 The legislature can issues that can be adjusted by the legislature. Both status quo policies and policy proposals (bills) are represented as points in K-dimensional Euclidean space. Second, there are M members in the legislature, whose preferences over the policy dimensions are additively separable and who vote strategically. Specifically, on any given dimension k, legislator j has a unique ideal point on that dimension, j k x , which is common knowledge. The utility that legislator j derives from a given policy vector, z = (z 1 ,…,z n ), declines with the sum of the distances between . We assume that members seek to maximize the utility that they derive from the final policy choice of the legislature (i.e., to minimize the summed distances between their ideal points and the final choices on each dimension). A consequence of this assumption is that the model of policy choice is, in essence, reduced to a series of independent unidimensional choices. Third, any legislator may introduce a bill dealing with any single issue dimension. Such bills may or may not be allowed onto the floor, depending on the actions taken at the agendasetting stage. Fourth, there exist agenda-setting agents who have the right to block bills from reaching the floor within their (fixed) jurisdictions. Fifth, the legislative sequence consists of only four stages: (1) members introduce bills; (2) some agent selects (or some agents select) the bills that the floor will consider (more specifically, the agents veto the bills they wish to veto and the remainder are thereby selected for floor consideration); (3) the floor then considers the bills presented to it, one by one, amending them as it sees fit; (4) the floor then votes on final passage of each bill (as amended if amended). Sixth, we focus on the special case in which all bills are considered under open rules, subject only to a germaneness restriction, as this is the simplest case to exposit. Shepsle (1979, p. 350) suggests that there are three possible agenda-setting agents in the Legislature: the Committee of the Whole, legislative parties, and committees. The third possibility, wherein autonomous and independent committees set the floor agenda, is the topic of Weingast's (1981, 1987) classic analyses. Cox and McCubbins (2002, 2005) focus is on the agenda-setting powers of the first two agents listed: the floor as a whole and the parties--in particular, the majority party. For our analysis here it doesn't matter who we think is the legislative agenda setter. 8 BLACK , supra note 7 9 F may differ on each issue, but for simplicity and without loss of generality, we drop the issue subscripts here. In addition to those mentioned above, our model makes the following assumptions: 1. There is no more than one group actively lobbying on one issue κ in each year, 2. Voters view the K dimensions as independent, separable issues, 3. The utility that a group gets from a change in a policy is equal to the absolute value of the distance between the status quo and a new policy such as i, given by |SQ -i|, 4. The costs of lobbying the legislature to take up an issue, C L , are equal for all groups lobbying in all issue dimensions, as are the costs of financing an initiative C I , and 5. Paying the costs of running an initiative campaign will result in the initiative passing with probability p, while paying the costs of lobbying the legislature will lead to the legislature adopting F with certainty.
handle far fewer than K many issues per term, and thus, in simplest terms, lobbyists must pay those who control the legislative agenda to induce them to incur the opportunity costs of acting on issue κ. We will ignore the game that this creates among lobbyists, as that is the topic of another paper.
10 If a policy advocate with an ideal point k x = i k seeks to change policy on issue κ, as illustrated in Figure 1 (where we have dropped the subscripts k), and if they are able to pay the cost to have the legislature put it on the agenda (denoted C L ), then the legislature will adopt F k , on issue k, even though the sponsor would prefer i k .
Figure 1: Placement of policy if legislature acts
Notice, the legislature will not be able to guarantee the adoption of a policy other than the floor median, F k . Once the legislature brings a proposal to the floor on issue κ, majoritarian influences will move policy to the floor median, F k . Coherent, concerted majorities may be able to pass a policy different than F k , using closed rules or disciplined voting, but they won't be able to always guarantee this outcome.
Therefore, a policy advocate has to judge whether F k is sufficient, given the lobbying costs, or whether an initiative should be sought in an attempt to force the enactment of i k , given 10 A more traditional model of lobbying might posit that the interest group pays a fee in order to shift the legislative floor's ideal point from a position that perfectly represents constituents to a corrupted ideal point that is closer to the interest group's goal. Indeed, this sort of corruption of legislatures by lobbyists is precisely what motivated many Progressives to push for direct democracy in the first place. However, whether the policy passed by the floor (F) reflects the floor's true ideal point or instead a revealed preference influenced by the lobbyist's efforts does not change the subsequent finding of our model, which is that groups will only pursue costly initiatives when they move policy much further away from the status quo than the legislature would have.
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issue κ the costs of qualifying and passing an initiative (denoted C I ) and the probability (denoted p) of passing an initiative located at i k . 11 Dropping the subscripts for ease of exposition, notice that if i is to the right of SQ, as in Figure 2 , the policy advocate will never lobby the legislature for access as the policy will end up at F, making the policy advocate worse off than leaving policy where it was at SQ.
Figure 2: Initiative sponsor will not lobby legislature
If it is indeed more costly to qualify and pass an initiative than it is to lobby the legislature for consideration of a new policy on issue κ, then we will see only two types of initiatives. 12 First, as in Figure 1 , if i is close to F, then it won't be worth the extra cost (relative to the cost of lobbying) of qualifying and passing an initiative, and the initiative sponsor will choose a lobbying strategy or will sit out the policy making process and take whatever the legislature produces. Thus, only initiatives that are extreme relative to F, the legislative median, 11 An interest group will pursue one of the three actions when the expected utility from that action (calculated by subtracting the cost of the action from the product of the group's utility from a successful policy change and the probability of success) exceeds the expected utilities from each of the other actions. Thus, the group will lobby the legislature when it yields a higher expected utility than the status quo (when |SQ-F| -C L > 0) and a higher utility than attempting an initiative (when |SQ-F| -C L > p(|SQ-i|) -C I ), otherwise lobbying would not be worthwhile. The group would attempt to quality and pass an initiative, whose policy is located at i, if and only if p(|SQ-i|) -C I > |SQ-F| -C L and when p(|SQ-i|) -C L > 0. For simplicity, to elucidate the decision problem for individuals, groups and parties in picking their strategies we have ignored the gaming aspects between competing groups that will greatly affect, in non-obvious ways, lobbying and initiative strategies. We leave that exercise for a different venue. 12 If we relaxed our assumption that utility smoothly declined with distance from the status quo, it would be possible that an interest group with an extremely steep utility function centered at a point in between the status quo and the floor median would find it worthwhile to sponsor an initiative located between SQ and F. However, because we cannot think of any such initiative, we do not alter our model in order to make this possible.
F SQ i
issue κ will be brought to the public as proposed policy changes. 13 If the probability, p, of passing an initiative declines the further i is from SQ, then there will exist a tradeoff between the costs of passing an initiative, C I , and the probability of getting it passed, which will impart a pressure on the policy advocate to move the proposed policy away from her ideal point and closer to SQ.
This tradeoff creates a limit on how extreme policy advocates will make their initiatives.
Second, if i is on the other side of the SQ from F, as in Figure 2 , then policy advocates will never pursue a lobbying strategy and will instead "go public" with an initiative to change policy. Such an action, however, would seem to be discouraged by strategic calculations, since the legislature could then respond by placing a referendum on the ballot to move policy back to F or to the voting median, V, if the median voter prefers i to F and SQ (and if V is closer to F than is i). 14 The condition for an initiative of this sort to be placed on the ballot is that V must be on the same side of SQ as is i and on the opposite side of F. Presumably, by Black's Theorem, V wins if it is offered to the people as a referendum, so the question for the policy advocate is whether it is worth the costs of proposing an initiative on this issue in order to get V. If V is close to SQ, then the answer is almost surely that it is not worth it. So, again, only extreme initiatives will be proposed.
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Extreme policies seem unlikely to enhance the public weal, but they need not necessarily be bad. However, if the transactions costs associated with enforcement grow with the distance of the policy change from SQ, then we may begin to think otherwise. Numerous transaction costs arise from the process of enforcing a new rule: the cost of investigating violations of the rule, the 13 The extremity of i, relative to F, will depend on the relative costs of lobbying versus the initiative process. As the initiative process increases in cost, both in terms of qualification and passage, then we expect initiatives to be more extreme. 14 Presumably, V is at or near F, at least in a district by district vote, ignoring problems of bicameralism and divided government. If V is indeed at or near F, then the threat of legislative referendum would be enough to deter any initiatives such as diagrammed in Figure 2 .
costs of bringing suits alleging violations of the rule, the administrative costs of the agency enforcing the rule, the public's cost of monitoring the government agency that enforces the rule, the costs of the losses that occur due to undeterred violations of the law, the costs of policing opportunistic behavior, and the costs associated with new behaviors that arise as people seek to get out from under the rule's effects. The larger the policy change, the higher the dead weight losses associated with it (because the more you are taking, the harder people will try to avoid it and the easier it will be to avoid, the more expensive will be the enforcement and so on). It seems reasonable to assume that transactions costs increase monotonically (if not faster) with the distance of the policy change from SQ. 16 There is a point, then, at some distance from SQ, where the transactions costs exceed the sum of utility gains for the society (if any) from a policy change, even if the policy change is otherwise favored by the voting median, V.
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The problem is exacerbated for initiatives, as the electoral environment in which voters make their decisions lack informational cues about these transactions costs. 18 In the legislative process, by comparison, lobbyists, agencies, and constituents can inform legislators about dead weight losses more effectively, and political parties have positions about both acceptable dead weight losses and who should bear them. The implication of this reasoning is that policy 15 We will ignore the costs of getting the legislature to implement initiative policies that are far from F. For a review of that thorny issue see GERBER ET AL, supra note 4. 16 Essentially, we are assuming that, in developed states, we are past the point of increasing returns to scale in coercion and are on the decreasing returns to scale in coercion. Wallis and North (1986) show that transactions costs grew as a percent of GDP in the United States over the 20 th Century. This appears to be true for other developed countries in Europe and for Japan as well. 17 If the SQ imposes significant costs, then bigger policy changes might mean imposing less costs, and therefore may result in lower transaction costs as more people choose to cooperate with the new policy. The increase in compliance will be at least partially offset by the likely decrease in compliance from groups that bear the costs of the new policy change. The net change in compliance and enforcement will affect the overall change in transaction costs. 18 As evidence for this proposition consider that many initiatives start out with high voter approval that declines as the opposition campaign gets started and that heavy spending can defeat almost any initiative. Often ad campaigns sell initiatives as good for everyone or bad for everyone, obscuring their true costs. Occasionally, campaigns highlight that the policy is good only for a few beneficiaries. Rarely do initiative campaigns highlight the direct proposals that end up on the ballot as initiatives are likely to lead to lower social welfare than policies enacted through the legislative process. 19 We turn next to argue that policies enacted through the initiative process are unlikely to be welfare enhancing and more likely to be merely wealth transfers or some other form of particularistic policy. transfer of resources from one group to another. When the costs are highlighted, the opposition message may get out in enough ways to make the losses seem large. 19 We may assume that the further is the initiative, i, from F (and likely the further it is from V), the less likely it is to pass, but, the probability is not zero, and the potential benefits may lead advocates for such a policy change to pursue a large gamble through the context of an initiative. 20 The willingness to expend such sums of money on the campaigns suggests there are significant gains for the sponsors of Indian gaming initiatives. 21 It is also clear from the literature on initiatives that a vigorous opposition will almost always sink an initiative at the ballot. 23 Policies and initiatives with concentrated costs will be more likely to draw organized opposition, all else constant. Thus from our typology of initiatives policies with concentrated benefits will be most likely make it to the ballot, and those with diffuse costs (and thus lacking organized opposition) will be most likely to pass, all else constant. 
Who Benefits

The Initiative Information Environment
The conclusion about the types of initiatives that will make it on the ballot has important implications for our understanding of how voters make decisions on these issues. One of the common findings in models of voter decision-making is that in complete information settings the The first of these conditions is the knowledge condition (which will only be met if the person receiving information believes that an endorser has knowledge or expertise about what he says). The second general condition is the trust condition (which will only be met if a person believes that the endorser is trustworthy). In order for this person to believe that an endorser is trustworthy, however, one of four additional conditions must also be met: 1) the person and endorser must have common interests, 2) there must be a threat of verification imposed upon the endorser, 3) the endorser must face penalties for lying, or 4) there must be observable, costly effort on the part of the endorser. 28 Lupia and Matsusaka supra note 3. "The conclusion that the majority is always better off having the initiative and referendum available is a fairly general property of complete information models but does not necessarily hold with incomplete information." (p.277)
Although we do not, at present, have the empirical evidence to determine how often the conditions for trust are met, we can provide theoretical reasons to suspect that incomplete information is a more likely outcome. First, as just discussed initiatives are unlikely to pass if there is significant opposition. Because of this, initiative sponsors will attempt to find issues that do not generate opposition. Initiatives are most likely, then, if the proposal has diffuse costs, and those who will pay the costs are unlikely to overcome the collective action problems of organizing an opposition to the proposal. Without organized opposition, the conditions for adversarial verification fail. One ironic consequence of this result is that the proponents may then lack credibility, unless the endorsers they use to deliver their message to the public otherwise meet one of the four conditions for trust.
Second, it is unlikely that advertising campaigns will present voters with information about the tradeoffs between initiatives (either across time or across items on the same ballot), which means that they are unlikely to satisfy the condition regarding knowledge of policy implications. With numerous initiatives on the ballot, even if voters can gain knowledge about each choice individually, they may not be able to predict the consequences of their actions when the interactive effects of all initiatives are taken together. Providing information about the tradeoffs among initiatives, or providing information about policy interactions, would seem unlikely to help one's campaign, while running the very real risk of creating opponents out of otherwise indifferent campaigns.
The argument just presented provides good reason to believe that initiative campaigns will rarely approximate conditions whereby voters can gain knowledge about their initiative choices. Indeed, Lupia's study of five 1988 California insurance initiatives, which pitted trial lawyers against insurance companies, seems more like an exception than the rule. 29 In that year there were multiple ballot measures all addressing the same general concerns and both opponents and proponents of the initiatives had a strong incentive to campaign for their side. 29 Lupia, supra note 24. 30 The expectation of opposition changes the probability of qualifying and passing an initiative, but if the stakes are high enough the sponsor may still continue with the initiative process. 31 Most of the literature, including this argument, is directed primarily at statewide campaigns. The full information conditions seem less likely to occur in the many city, county or regional initiatives that change local government charters. For instance, imagine a proposal to change from a weak to strong mayor form of government. Is it likely that both sides will be organized and run campaigns? On the other hand, local initiatives that deal with land use issues probably will tap issues with concentrated costs and benefits, and thus spur serious campaigns on both sides, but because of this are more likely to lose. 32 Between 60 and 70% of the U.S. population lives in a city with an initiative, and between 70 and 75% of the U.S. population lives in either a city or a state with an initiative process (Matsusaka I&R in American Cities, Basic Patterns) 33 campaigns and thus whether voters are able to make welfare-enhancing choices. The implication of this experimental research on trust is that simply identifying the presence of information in the form of advertisements or endorsements does not allow one to draw the conclusion that voters have learned from the information. Although the empirical work in this field is of great interest and has made strides in beginning to identify some effects of the initiative process, the studies
have not yet incorporated the conditions for trust and learning into their models of the effects of campaigns. Furthermore, showing that exposure to an initiative campaign increases the proportion of people who vote, give campaign contributions or correctly answer information questions is not equivalent to showing that they can make choices that improve welfare.
The combination of the slim likelihood for the conditions for verification to be met and the sheer number of initiatives facing voters in states such as California further compounds the information problem facing voters. In the end, it seems unlikely voters will have access to the cues needed to make informed decisions for most initiatives.
Who is setting the agenda?
We have just argued that initiatives are likely to be extreme particularistic policies, with concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, and that there is a significant chance that voters will lack the information necessary to make informed decisions. So, the odds that initiatives will improve social welfare seem small. In this section we further question the beneficial effects of initiatives by considering a variety of social choice critiques that seem particularly pernicious with respect not be a random sample of all states, in which case we need an observation of our dependent variable before the initiative was implemented to definitely conclude that the initiative caused the change in the variable of interest. to the initiative process, critiques that have largely escaped comment in the literature on initiatives.
The unidimensional initiative
One of the key problems with initiatives, and one that leads to a host of subsequent problems, is that they are likely to be one-dimensional policy moves with multi-dimensional repercussions. 35 First, in 12 of the 23 states that allow initiative petitions there are single-subject rules with regards to proposed initiatives. These rules almost guarantee that initiatives will only address a single issue, such as increasing school funding, without presenting voters with the other (obvious) dimensions of the policy change -increased taxes or decreased spending in another area. Second, even in the absence of a single subject rule or where it is loosely enforced, initiative sponsors will prefer to propose one-dimensional policies. The addition of a second, third or fourth dimension is political suicide because it increases the possibility of generating opposition. Because opponents of initiatives are more likely to be successful in their campaign than proponents, there is a strong reason not to incite opponents. Because of this tactical concern, voters are likely to see one dimensional policy moves and be asked to make yes or no decisions about a multitude of single dimension ballot measures, which has important consequences for the results of the initiative process. 35 It is important to note that in legislative bodies where voting is largely one-dimensional (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) there is reason to believe the existence of a single dimension is the result of the legislative process collapsing many dimensions into a single dimension. Given that the initiative process lacks the institutions that generate this outcome it is unreasonable to expect a similar outcome from initiatives.
Inability to make tradeoffs
One of the key features of the legislative process, particularly during the appropriations stage, is that legislators make trade-offs between priorities both within a given year's budget and across time. 36 However, in the models of voter decision making during initiative campaigns voters are presumed to be choosing between a "yes" and "no" vote on a single initiative, along a single dimension. 37 In such a situation these models typically find that initiatives either make the legislature more responsive to the median voter or that only those policies favored by the median voter will be approved. 38 One limit to these models is that they do not address how voters make tradeoffs between different initiatives. Consider that in many elections there are multiple issues to be voted upon, and voters must not only be able to consider the tradeoffs for a particular initiative, but they must also weigh initiatives against each other. For voters to calculate these tradeoffs (what do they think they'll have to give up in order to get the policy proposed by the initiative?) they must:
1) have a good idea about how each policy proposal will be financed (what do they give up to get it) or how it will otherwise affect the status quo;
2) know the externalities associated with each proposition (doing one thing may preclude doing other things or may enable or disable the successful implementation of other policies);
3) have knowledge about all of the ballot proposals; It is worth considering the assumptions contained within these models, because it suggests how rarely all the conditions will be met. For example, Gerber (1996) assumes 1) simple binary agenda; 2) no substitute initiatives; 3) both "yes" and "no" campaigns for verification purposes or voter knowledge of the policy implications of the initiative; 4) single stage game that ends; 5)one dimension of policy; and 6) 100% voter turnout.
4) be able to determine the probability that each of the other proposals will pass, (so they can calculate an expected combined effect for their actions on each ballot initiative) and these probabilities must be common knowledge so that all voters act on similar expectations.
Only with all of these conditions satisfied can a voter make decisions that aid in moving policy towards her most preferred position. At the same time, the fact that the conditions for successful policy choice are so stringent (if any one of these conditions fails the voter will be unable to form an expectation about the consequences of her actions) does not, however, imply that they will never be able to do so. Of course, the greater the number of initiatives and the worse the knowledge environment is for each, the worse off voters will be.
For voters to actually weigh prisons versus schools, for example, they must know not only the costs of each policy, but also how the two policies affect each other. We know that in the absence of a tradeoff between services or tax levels voters will prefer more of almost all government services or the same level and lower taxes. 39 So, the relevant question about the information environment is will voters be provided, and use, the information, or substitute cues, to choose between initiatives focused on schools, jails, lottery, insurance and nuclear power?
Will cues be sufficient to help voters weigh these perhaps conflicting policies against each other and to account for the costs of each proposed policy change? It is difficult to imagine that initiative supporters will provide this type of universal tradeoff information. The proponents of a hypothetical measure A are unlikely to argue against measure B (if they are about different issues), because doing so will likely lead to a response from the proponents of measure B.
Because the opposition has the upper hand in initiative campaigns it would appear to be a poor strategy to take action that increases the likelihood of generating opponents.
Moreover, when there is no opposition to an initiative, as is the case for a great many initiatives, and is to be expected for the concentrated benefits, diffuse cost proposals we expect to see on the ballot. Furthermore, our observation living in California is that information about how the goals of one initiative interact with the goals of another is unlikely to be widely available. If voters lack information about how the passage of two initiatives will affect each other or the general policy environment, it is easy to have outcomes that lead to non-Pareto improving, and therefore non-welfare enhancing, results. pitted against all other initiatives), but this process also makes it particularly difficult for citizens to make tradeoffs over time. As the example illustrates, when proposals are pitted against each 42 Adapted from PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 68 (1986 citizens voted to restrict radioactive waste disposal, but then in 1988, they failed to ban the electric power plants that produced such nuclear waste. Needless to say, citizens in these two time periods passed measures that were largely at odds with each other-with the 1988 result perpetuating the problem that the 1982 initiative sought to solve.
Initiatives are Sequential Elimination Agendas
The above anecdotes suggest that the theoretical problems of sequential elimination agendas have an empirical basis in the initiative process. Indeed, these anecdotes demonstrate that when citizens must choose alternatives over time without being able to compare them directly, they are unlikely to consider tradeoffs and are, therefore, almost certain to pass contradictory measures that have deleterious economic, social, and/or political consequences.
44 44 As an example of a deleterious political consequence, consider a legislature charged with implementing contradictory initiatives. When faced with such contradictions, the legislature will be unable to satisfy the
Who is Setting the Agenda?
Another problem with the initiative process is that it does not allow for careful selection of those who set the agenda. Social choice theorists and game theorists have long noted that agenda setters can be, for all intents and purposes, "dictators" when it comes to determining political outcomes 45 , and they have also emphasized that under certain conditions, there is a risk that agenda setters, through strategically setting the agenda, can induce outcomes that diverge from the preferences of the median voter 46 and, in fact, are Pareto inferior. 47 This possibility seems particularly acute in the initiative setting, given that we previously established that initiatives will generally be extreme relative to the floor median of the legislature. Given the existence of such a risk, scholars have analyzed real world instances of agenda setting and have discussed the ways that agenda setters can be constrained to be faithful agents of those they represent. 48 Although there are, of course, many ways to constrain agenda setters, most relevant to this paper are screening and selection mechanisms.
Screening and selection mechanisms are important because they help to ensure that faithful agenda setters are chosen in the first place. As many scholars note, ex ante screening and selection are particularly important, for it can be very costly to sort good agenda setters from conflicting demands of citizens, and will therefore partially implement the initiatives, perhaps generating frustration with government and spawning more initiatives that also cannot be implemented. With the initiative process, however, it is impossible to screen and select faithful agenda setters because any individual or group with sufficient resources can place an initiative on the ballot. This aspect of the initiative process allows virtually anyone to become an agenda setter, and it is this "direct democracy" aspect of the initiative process that is frequently lauded as one of its greatest strengths. 51 The one mechanism designed to screen out initiative agenda settersthe requirement that they collect a specified number of signatures in order to qualify for the ballot -does not in any way guarantee that sponsors have the public interest in mind. The industry of paid signature gathering, nearly as old as direct democracy itself, now guarantees that whoever has the requisite amount of money (now more than a million dollars in California) can qualify virtually any initiative for the ballot. As the above discussion of screening and selection makes clear, however, allowing anyone with sufficient resources to become an agenda setter is problematic, for there is then no mechanism to select agenda setters who will pursue policies that benefit a majority of citizens. Furthermore, with the rise of crypto-initiatives there will be an increasing number of agenda setters that use the initiative process to manipulate outcomes to serve their ends.
Consequences
As a result of these flaws in the initiative process we believe that initiatives are likely to lead to deleterious outcomes. One such outcome is that they bust a state's budget, or require 70 In a clear, but perhaps overly humble, statement of their activity, ACORN declares "When most community organizations still believed in sitting on the sidelines on election day, ACORN was leading the way in voter registration, education, and mobilization. In the most recent election cycle, ACORN registered over 200,000 new voters, and made over 1 million non-partisan contacts to infrequent voters encouraging them to vote." One might question the "non-partisan" nature of their contacts given the information above. According to their website, www.acorn.org, in recent years, ACORN has led ballot initiative campaigns in San Francisco, Phoenix, Pine Bluff City and Kansas City. They work closely with their "sister" organization, Project Vote, to build "voter registration, education and mobilization networks" to turnout "new and infrequent voters around issues that are important to their families and communities, thus giving previous non-voters a reason to vote" (p. 24) ACORN Annual Report, 2003. by the Washington Times, their "plan concluded that initiatives increase voter turnout and that 'minimum wage initiatives can significantly increase the turnout of supporters without increasing turnout from the opposition'." 71 ACORN declared its three major goals as "driving heightened Republican. Through waves of phone surveys, personal interviews and shopping-mall focus groups the political strategists discovered that this age group and demographic were unhappy and highly motivated about transportation (they complain bitterly about their daily commutes to and from downtown Denver). In response, these Democratic Party activists helped sponsor an initiative in 2004: FasTracks, which increased mass transit funding. One of the critical aspects of this strategy was getting Republicans, such as Governor Bill Owens, to oppose the measures, which would provide a cue to the targeted voters that their interests were more similar to Democrats than Republicans. As expected, Governor Owens publicly opposed the transit initiative. When the $3.5 million campaign for the transit initiative was done and the election results were counted, it appeared the Democratic strategy had worked on multiple fronts. First, although the initiative was designed to be instrumental in generating turnout, the policy proposal also passed. Second, while the rest of the country was electing Republicans, Coloradans elected Democrats to the U.S. Senate, U.S. House, and the Colorado Assembly. Indeed, Democrats have control of the Colorado legislature for the first time in over 40 years.
The anecdotes just offered suggest that thinking about initiatives only in terms of their policy outcomes ignores other possibly significant effects on registration, turnout, and election outcomes. As a matter of fact, if initiatives determine who wins the presidency, the Senate and state houses, we are ignoring their most important effects.
In what follows we show that initiatives are indeed known to affect voter turnout and we provide a model of how wedge and jack issues influence voter turnout. These forms of cryptoinitiatives are particularly problematic because they are a form of political pork and the combination of 527s and party involvement is likely to increase their use. Finally, we argue that the implicit analogy between the initiative market and economic markets is not applicable and does not eliminate the problems we raised throughout this paper.
Initiatives are known to affect turnout
We have been using the term crypto-initiatives to refer to cases where the proponent's primary goal is to affect political outcomes rather than policy. Such initiatives -also discussed The second tactical consideration for mobilizing turnout is to choose issues that are likely to resonate with nonvoters, which may lead to turnout different than a simple random sample of nonvoters. As a whole, nonvoters are less politically interested and less partisan than voters. However, the nonvoters who are most receptive to a campaign's get out the vote driveespecially one based on an initiative's policy effects -are likely to be the most politically engaged, educated, and partisan members of that group. Campaigns conducting "strategic mobilization" 78 target these voters, whose sense of the stakes of politics and psychological attachment to one of the "teams" allow them to see the benefits of turning out. Turnout initiatives that seek to tempt voters to the polls by offering a policy that they strongly favor could attract a subset of nonvoters that is unrepresentative of the mass of nonvoters.
Recent works on initiatives and turnout suggest that this is, in fact, often the case. First, The anecdotes presented at the beginning of this section suggest that political operatives have discovered the immense partisan possibilities of initiatives and are increasing their usage of the process. Setting of the initiative agenda by party operatives would not seem to be a happy occurrence, because strategic political actors will pick strategies, which we call either wedges or jacks, to serve their partisan goals even if they lead to the passage of bad policies. Increasing usage of these types of initiatives will exacerbate their negative consequences of initiatives.
Wedge Initiatives
We use the term wedge initiatives to describe those that are designed to split the opposition party and help one's party by drawing support from the opposition. The following two conditions are necessary for a wedge issue. First, the status quo must be favored by the other party, and particularly the status quo must help extreme members of the other party. Second, a change in status quo must benefit the party looking to use the initiative. Figure 3 presents this situation spatially. M represents the dispersion of ideal points within the majority party, which is protecting the SQ even though it is far from the floor median, F. The minority party, m, can use a wedge, w, to induce a portion of the majority party to support a change in policy on this dimension (everyone to the left of c will prefer w to SQ, and thus w drives a wedge, at c, into the majority party). To insure the support of F, the minority will offer a new policy that is at or near In addition, wedge issues present a particularly difficult aspect for voter information models. Because the initiative is not about policy, but about turnout, the sponsor of the wedge would actually like opposition, as doing so makes it easier to tie it around the other party's neck.
The wedge serves as bait, and if the other party takes it, then it will become clear that the party is protecting some of its extreme members. Therefore, if the opposition understands it is a wedge issue they should vacillate on the issue and try to keep it off the agenda. The mere fact that there are extreme policies that have not moved to the floor median suggests that the majority party has already been quite effective in keeping it off the agenda until the initiative was raised. If the opposition follows its political incentives and stays silent on the initiative, then we are left with an environment that does not meet the conditions for voters to make informed decisions.
Jack Initiatives
A jack initiative is designed to help a party's candidates by jacking up turnout in one targeted portion of the electorate. 82 The growth of jack initiatives, which are about increasing turnout among a targeted sample of the population, is particularly troubling. These policies are likely to have highly concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, which helps increase turnout only among beneficiaries. Geographically targeted projects, such as new roads, rail lines, schools, etc, seem to be ideal policies to have this effect at the local level. The passage of FasTracks and minimum wage initiatives are prototypical examples of this type of statewide policy. The ACORN document that discussed the Florida minimum wage strategy makes the targeted benefits clear, "Giving our constituency an opportunity to vote themselves a raise is probably the most compelling reason to go to the ballot box." 83 It is hard to think of a more direct, targeted benefit than the ability to vote yourself a raise, paid for by a highly diffuse set of consumers and businesses. The minimum wage issue was also important because it had a differential effect on turnout. It did not generate unified business opposition (many businesses already pay wages well above the minimum wage and so had little incentive to oppose it) and therefore the opposition campaign did not motivate its likely supporters. Considered in this light, jack initiatives look a lot like a new form of distributive politics, which has been well and thoroughly discussed in the congressional and policy literature. 84 Initiatives that fall into this category not only have effects on the larger political process, but they also act to increase the amount of pork in the political environment. 85 Therefore, the effects of jack initiatives must include the additional pork that they introduce into politics and the effect that pork has on the quality of policy.
A good jack issue will only cause a targeted group of potential supporters to turn out to the polls, likely because a proposal has concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. In this environment there is unlikely to be organized opposition to the initiative. Without an opposition the campaign environment does not meet the conditions for full information 86 or trust 87 so there is no reason to believe outcomes will improve upon the status quo. These jack issues are not designed to be public regarding. Indeed, extensive polling was done (in Colorado) to find issues that had concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, and that drive turnout up for one party but not the other. Policy is not the point. Good public policy would only be a fortunate, if unlikely, accident.
Certainly pork barrel policy has been extensively used by legislatures to serve political purposes, and we should believe that pork barrel initiatives will also become increasingly 
The Efficient Initiative Market?
Although scholars are ambiguous about why positive outcomes will occur via the initiative process, they appear to have something in mind like an "efficient initiative hypothesis"
(EIH), which they consider to be an analogy to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH initiative process, and then we consider why such the analogy between initiatives and markets is inappropriate.
It seems to us that the most likely model implicit in the literature is one in which "policy entrepreneurs" propose different products, and then voters acting as policy consumers choose which ones to purchase by casting their scarce votes. In the EMH, price conveys all publicly available information about an asset, given the decisions of well-informed and rational market traders. 92 Consumers purchase only the products that serve their goals, and guided by the invisible hand, the aggregate outcome is welfare enhancing (i.e., it is efficient). If this is the analogy being used, then we presume the collective decisions of market participants are represented by the median voter, and policy entrepreneurs are equivalent to marketers who introduce new products. If this is the appropriate analogy, then we conclude that policies supported by the median voter must improve welfare.
The basic analogy, however, between efficient markets and initiatives is not reasonable.
First, what in the EIH plays the role of price in the EMH? One can't simply gloss over the absence of something equivalent to price, because prices, and the information they convey, are the heart of the EMH. 93 So, unless there's a suitable analogy in the initiative process then the analogy between the EMH and the EIH simply makes no sense. Second, there is no clear theory about how selecting the median voter's ideal point on a series of one-dimensional issues is likely to improve net welfare. Is there something equivalent to the invisible hand of the median voter?
Third, for reasons already discussed, voters will often lack the information necessary to make decisions equivalent to the decisions of consumers in a market (who base their choices on price, which is absent in the EIH). In situations that do not qualify as complete information, such as when there aren't credible endorsers on both sides of a policy or there are multiple initiatives with multiple endorsers, then we don't know whether voters will act to become informed or not and we suspect they will not. We are betting our democracy and perhaps our very lives on a hunch, an undeveloped analogy, that politicians won't lie to us. Fourth, when making consumption decisions people are able to make decisions simultaneously on multiple dimensions and can thus make tradeoffs among their various choices. But such decisions are difficult, if not impossible, in choosing among initiatives. 94 Fifth, we have spent many pages demonstrating how, in the end, policy can be Pareto-inefficient, even when the median favors each policy choice dimension by dimension. Sixth, the initiative process can be manipulated by agenda setting, which determines what options voters see and the order in which they are considered.
Neither of these last two problems with the initiative process have an analog in markets. Seventh, there seems to be a common theme among initiative proponents that simply having more options makes voters better off. There is not a clear theory of how aggregating voters' decisions across a variety of political dimensions improves policy outcomes. Such an assumption is based on something akin to the invisible hand of economic markets, but there is not an analog to price, form of market failure, and asymmetry of information may be a source of market power, and is often thought to be a source of political power. 94 Think of each initiative battle as a market share competition in which consumers chose between the status quo and a new product, much as they do between Coke and Pepsi or Ford and Toyota. The alternative preferred by most consumers gets the highest market share and thus wins. The trouble with this analogy is that voters are left with no way to consider trade-offs across different types of goods. A consumer with a finite budget constraint recognizes that her choice of a higher priced product for one type of good constrains her choices in another area. Legislators dealing with multiple issues as once also face such a budget constraint. For consumers who spend only their votes, which would have to exist for us to believe there is an invisible hand for the "initiative market."
Furthermore, the problems with the initiative information environment that we discussed earlier also make it unlikely that simply offering a multitude of options will improve social welfare. For these reasons it seems unreasonable to use the EMH to understand initiatives.
This discussion leads us to believe that there is not an "efficient market" for initiatives.
The previously discussed pathologies of initiatives are not overcome simply by comparing voters to consumers and initiatives to products. Given the problems with the initiative process it is unclear why aggregating policy preferences via a series of uncoordinated, low-information elections will lead to improved outcomes.
Conclusion
Lupia and Matsusaka faithfully report that "recent breakthroughs in theory and empirical analysis paint a comparatively positive picture of the initiative and referendum." 95 We have attempted to provide more troubling empirical examples along with theoretical reasons to be less sanguine. Throughout this paper we have presented a variety of reasons why the initiative process in general and crypto-initiatives in particular, are unlikely to improve policy outcomes.
In fact, all of the institutional solutions to social choice problems that scholars have studied 96 are lacking in the initiative context. This should be a strong indication that outcomes are unlikely to be positive, as we demonstrated in our discussion of social choice problems for initiatives. The deleterious consequences of partisan manipulation of the initiative agenda is further affected by the rise of 527 crypto-PACs. Crypto-initiatives will tend to be particularistic and will typically not foster the creation of a voter-friendly information environment or a social-welfare enhancing choice environment. The combined effect of crypto-initiatives and crypto-PACs seems very unlikely to improve social welfare.
Our conclusion about the negative consequences of the initiative process leads us to suggest that legislatures are generally a better way to make law. Legislative lawmaking includes the ability to make tradeoffs through the budget process, greater resources to study and determine possible effects of policy change, and compared to constitutional amendments legislative changes are less permanent. Despite our generally greater support for the legislative process, we do acknowledge that there are times when the legislature may be corrupt or captured by special interests. In those circumstances, the initiative may be a useful way to change policy, but it should be made more difficult to change policy via initiatives so that they are only used when the legislature is particularly ineffective.
We also recognize that the legislature may suffer from many of the same social choice problems that plague initiatives, but there are two important differences. First, the legislature has to make policy tradeoffs within its budget process every year or two. So, even if adopted policies are rushed, one-dimensional, or the result of pandering, eventually the state has to face tradeoffs in passing its budget. This process helps to mitigate problems from the initial adoption. Second, the legislature typically doesn't amend the constitution so changes are not permanent and can be amended or repealed by statute as opposed to initiatives that often permanently amend the state constitution. The greater flexibility of legislative policy avoids solidifying bad policy choices.
Also, changes in public opinion that affect the election of legislators can affect public policy through the legislature rather than requiring someone to bring an initiative and pass it if the public wants to amend or repeal a previously passed constitutional amendment. For these two reasons, the legislature seems to be a better arena for law making than the initiative process.
Since initiatives, campaign finance reform, and the other imperfect reforms of the Twentieth Century seem here to stay, we offer three proposals that we believe would improve the outcomes from the initiative process. First, require initiatives to meet the "pay as you go" standard, in which new policy proposals must either contain a funding source or explain what is to be cut in the budget to fund the new program. The adoption of this proposal makes the tradeoffs more explicit and also increases the probability of generating opposition, which is more likely to meet the conditions necessary for voters to become informed. Second, initiatives should be subject to amendment by the legislature. Every other type of policy making in the U.S. is subject to checks and balances. In California and in many localities, no such checks and balances exist for initiatives. This condition will force initiative sponsors to recognize the implementation difficulties faced by the legislature and may also constrain extreme initiatives because they can be more easily moderated. Third, initiatives should contain Sunset Provisions that require either voters or the legislature to reconsider the policy and determine if they wish to keep it after a specified time period. This would reduce the permanence of the constitutional changes and make it easer to rollback ineffective or negative policies. These three additions to the initiative process will force their sponsors to anticipate the reactions of voters and legislatures to the trade-offs inherent in their proposals. This would make it more likely that initiatives would be welfare enhancing, even if it makes them less common.
